EXHIBIT 2

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
3	ROBOCAST,)
4	
5) Case No. vs.) 22-CV-305-RGA-
6) JLH
7	NETFLIX,
8	Defendant.)
9	ROBOCAST,)
10	
11) Case No. vs.) 22-CV-354-RGA-
12) JLH
13	GOOGLE,
14	Defendant.)
15	
16	TRANSCRIPT OF DISCOVERY CONFERENCE
17	
18	DISCOVERY CONFERENCE had before the
19	Honorable Jennifer L. Hall, U.S.M.J., via
20	teleconference on the 29th of August, 2023.
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1	APPEARANCES
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17	BY: FRED COTTRELL, ESQ. GRIFFING SCHOENBAUM, ESQ.
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20	
21	Counsel for Google
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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone.

This is Jen Hall. We're on the line today to hear a number of discovery disputes. We have

Robocast versus Netflix. It's 22-305. We also have Robocast versus Google. It's 22-354.

Let's put appearances on the record starting with Robocast

MR. GOLDEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GOLDEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Good afternoon. This is Ronald Golden from

Bayard PA on behalf of Robocast. I have with

me on the line from McKool Smith Casey

Shomaker, William Ellerman, and Samuel Moore.

THE COURT: Great. Good afternoon to all of you.

And how about Netflix?

MS. FARNAN: Yes, good afternoon,
Your Honor. This is Kelly Farnan from
Richards, Layton, and Finger on behalf of
Netflix. Tyler Cragg from my office is also on
the line. I'm joined by my co-counsel at
Latham and Watkins Tara Elliott, Rachel Cohen,
and Kimberly Li. We also have Laura Carrington
from Netflix on the line, and Ms. Cohen will
address the disputes before the Court today.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

1 And how about in 22-304, Google? 2 DFT TWO: Good afternoon, Your Honor, 3 Fred Cottrell from Richards Layton for YouTube and Google in 22-304. Also from my office, 4 5 Griffin Schoenbaum. And my co-counsel from Wilson Sonsini, Jordan Jaffe, and Mr. Jaffe 6 7 will be speaking on behalf of the defendants. THE COURT: Great. That's fine. We 8 have a court reporter on the line today. 9 I can tell you we've taken a look at the 10 letters, and as we did so, we were reminded 11 12 that we've already talked about some of these 13 issues once this summer. Doesn't seem like we've made much progress since then, so let's 14 15 see what we can get done today. Let's start with the defendants' 16 disputes. I've read the letters. Anything 17 that Netflix wants to add to its argument about 18 19 the interrogatories? MS. COHEN: Hi, Your Honor. 20 This is Rachel Cohen on behalf of Latham and Watkins 21 22 for the defendant Netflix.

Just in terms of the first issue in dispute for Defendant Netflix and Google, it applies to them as well, in terms of the

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numerosity dispute, Defendants -- Robocast, the plaintiff in this case, doesn't actually defend its counting at all in its responsive letter. The interrogatories at issue here were served on March 1st of this year. It's been six months, and they have not responded to a single substantive -- a single substantive response to any of the served interrogatories. They do not defend the numerosity issue.

And the served interrogatories are consistent with the interrogatories that are served in this court that are commonly before the court, and to the extent -- I'm happy to engage into why each one goes to the topical issue and seeks the facts and circumstances that go to the call of the question, if the Court would like, but it is consistent with practice that is consistent in this court, and I think Robocast unfortunately invites the court to start deviating from the practice, and doing so would certainly increase the number of discovery disputes in this jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay. And anything that YouTube and Google want to add just about the interrogatory number issue?

MR. JAFFE: Thank you, Your Honor.

This is Jordan Jaffe on behalf of Google and

YouTube. I won't repeat what Ms. Cohen

mentioned, so I'll be brief.

We agree, as to Google and YouTube, that Robocast did not defend its counting in its responsive brief, so in our view the easiest way to resolve this dispute would be simply to overrule the numerosity objections because none of them have the discrete subparts, so we're substantially under the limit.

We think if you look at the Megatives case -- hopefully I'm pronouncing that correctly -- Judge Burke lays out an example where Defendants in Interrogatory 2 describe "the development efforts that relate to the alleged technologies" and goes through and has them talking about the first described in writing, first manufactured. And as Judge Burke explained in that case, those were each subsumed within the larger interrogatory and are not discrete subparts.

For all those reasons, we believe the subpart issue for Google and YouTube that they all are -- do not comprise discrete and

separate subparts that are then subsumed within the single one. That's part one.

And then part two, the numerosity objection, I think that Ms. Cohen mentioned we -- the better course for them would be to answer at least the 25 interrogatories rather than refuse to answer them all, and we've got the caselaw in our brief, and I'm happy to address it if the Court would like.

THE COURT: All right. Let's hear from Robocast on this.

MS. SHOMAKER: Yes, Your Honor.

Casey Shomaker for Plaintiff Robocast.

Robocast believes in the letters that we exchanged with Netflix over the past couple months and in addition our briefing submitted in front of this Court that we've cited the caselaw that supports our position that these 'rogs comprise multiple subparts.

As noted in our briefing, we offered compromise positions to both Google and Netflix wherein Google and Netflix could withdraw the objectionable interrogatories and thereby Robocast would comply with the law back on point in response to those interrogatories

without waiving numerosity objections. This was reiterated multiple times, and neither party took us up on it, and so we were forced to comply with the law and not waive our objections, so that's truly why we haven't responded to any of the interrogatories.

THE COURT: Are you wanting me to find that these are more than 25 that you were served? Because you didn't even argue how that's the case.

MS. SHOMAKER: Yes, Your Honor. So these are multiple -- both Google and Netflix served multiple interrogatories, more than 25 interrogatories. With respect to Google, Google served -- exceeded the 25-interrogatory limit when they served Interrogatory Number 12, and so the -- our responses to interrogatories 1 through 11 were pending when they served their final interrogatory; therefore, there were more than 25 pending interrogatories at the time. And Netflix only served one set of interrogatories, and each one in that entire set included more than 25 interrogatories and, in fact, 45 discrete subparts.

THE COURT: Okay. We've got a lot to

1 get through today, so I'll keep my ruling 2 brief. I disagree with how Robocast has handled 3 this, both in terms of how it responded to the 4 5 parties and particularly with respect to its position against Google, who even Robocast 6 7 agrees did not serve more than 25 interrogatories. 8 How long have these interrogatories been 9 pending? 10 11 MS. SHOMAKER: Six months for 12 Netflix. Nearly six months. September 1st 13 will be six months. Your Honor, THE COURT: Okay. And then just, 14 15 again, a third thing of the reasons I disagree with how Robocast handled this was in its 16 17 briefing to this Court, there's no attempt made to even provide the Court with how it counted 18 or why it's appropriate, basically putting the 19 burden on the Court to expend time and 20 resources. 21 22 So Robocast needs to respond to all of the interrogatories within one week to both 23 parties. These have been pending a long time. 24 You should know what the answers are. I don't 25

think I have anything more to say on that.

Netflix has a couple other issues.

MS. COHEN: This is Rachel Cohen again for Netflix. The second issue is Robocast's deficient Rule 26(a) disclosures as it relates to damages.

So as the plaintiff in this case,
Robocast has an obligation under Rule 26,
consistent with Judge Andrews' decisions in the
NexStep case as well as the Conflow case, to
identify -- it respectfully requires initial
computation and disclosure of the evidence that
Robocast will rely upon, to the full extent
that it can or should know of it.

We were happy to see that for the first time after months of going round and round on their good-faith basis for asserting lost profits that they finally acknowledged to the Court that it can't or won't pursue lost profits in this case, and that's a start, but it really doesn't solve the disclosure of what they actually do intend to seek in terms of a reasonable royalty.

The -- under the Court's the prior law that I just cited to, they do have an

obligation to explain what they can and do know, and those include, Your Honor, among other things, an explanation of how the licenses directed to the patents-in-suit -- at least one has been previously licensed -- how do those three licenses play into their damages theories in this case, their terms of the license, the duration, the licensing package of the patentee. That's *Georgia Pacific* factor number four.

Georgia Pacific factor number five talks about the relationship between the patentee and accused infringer. Notwithstanding our efforts for the last six months to get discovery from Robocast, they refused to identify any of that information, which was squarely in their possession. They know if they have a competing product or patent infringing product. They know if the parties are competitors. That's information that they possess and that, under Rule 26, they have an obligation to disclose and they've been withholding.

They also have attempted to shift the burden to seek discovery from Netflix before it can disclose information that's solely in its

1 possession, and that's wrong based on the law 2 we obviously cite to in our papers. 3 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Robocast. 4 5 So you agree, don't you, that you need to update your Rule 26 disclosures immediately, 6 given the fact that you have now said that you 7 are not seeking lost profits, do you not? 8 MR. ELLERMAN: Your Honor, this is 9 Will Ellerman for Robocast. We have already 10 done that. We have already updated our Rule 26 11 12 disclosures to clarify we are not seeking lost 13 profits. THE COURT: I don't have the current 14 version of the disclosures in front of me? 15 MR. ELLERMAN: No, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: When were those updated? 17 MR. ELLERMAN: Sometime last week 18 before the briefing on this. 19 20 THE COURT: So how am I supposed to determine whether or not your current 21 22 disclosures are good enough if I don't have them? 23 24 MR. ELLERMAN: Well, Your Honor, I believe Netflix included the -- at least one 25

version of the disclosures in their letter since this was their issue, and what we did was delete the reference to lost profits. And so our disclosures, as they stand today, seek reasonable royalty damages. We have complied with Rule 26 to the best of our ability in that regard.

The NexStep case that Netflix cites, you know, that case is, number one, distinguishable because that struck a new damages theory that was disclosed for the first time on the eve of trial, and the case says that all a claimant has to do, its only obligation, is to disclose information about its damages to the best of its ability. And Netflix has not given any reason or any authority that would require Robocast to give a damages calculation at a time when Netflix has given us virtually no financial discovery whatsoever.

And as we cited in our papers, Your Honor, the advisory committee notes to this rule cite a patent case as the example of when a plaintiff is simply not able to provide a complete damages disclosure at the outset of a case because all relevant information is in the

defendant's possession. And we may be getting
a little bit ahead of ourselves into some of
the other issues here, but Netflix's production
to date is woefully inadequate.

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you right there. I'm looking right now at Exhibit G to Netflix's letter. And so what you're saying is you deleted out the paragraph on page six that talks about lost profits, but you still have in there the reasonable royalty paragraph that says that the analysis you're going to use is the hypothetical negotiation and that you've got licenses with Microsoft and Apple and that you're also going to look at licenses produced by Netflix, and you're going to come up with a royalty rate. Is that essentially what it says?

MR. ELLERMAN: That's correct, Your Honor, and we've --

THE COURT: Okay. So under the circumstances here, I'm going to hold that that's good enough for now, given that you dropped your lost profits. But again, the issue as it was presented to me was that you were seeking lost profits. You didn't drop

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that until after they raised it, and I would have agreed with them that this wasn't enough, that you were seeking it to sue lost profits, and it shouldn't have taken a discovery motion to get this resolved.

Let's move on to the next issue that Netflix has.

MS. COHEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

The third issue that we raised is Robocast's limitations on its document production. Throughout its submissions, and it sounds like this is where it's going again in this hearing, Robocast has represented it produced more than a million documents in this litigation. But it also acknowledges that those documents were merely a reproduction reproducing and reusing all of its submissions and exchanges from the Microsoft and Apple litigation, which both resolved in 2014. admitted that it does not intend to produce any documents after 2014, and, obviously, the relevant damages window that it has alleged in this case is 2016 to 2020, and it has indicated to us that it has no intention of producing any documents in that window.

Although it argues that the materials are not relevant or somehow they believe there's no relevance to those documents, we pointed out repeatedly setting aside the lost profits, which we just discussed they dropped, those documents are also relevant to the hypothetical negotiation and the *Georgia Pacific* factors. Of course, the Federal Circuit has explained that the *Book of Wisdom* allows the parties in the hypothetical negotiation to take a look beyond the date of the hypothetical negotiation itself to inform those discussions.

And whether they have a practicing product, which they refuse to tell us, whether they have a product that is within the scope of the claims, whether the parties competed, all of that information is highly relevant, both at the time of the hypothetical negotiation and in the window of the alleged damages of 2016 to 2020. And those are highly relevant both in terms of damages as well as claim scope, liability, and infringement, as well as invalidity in this case. We do believe we have shown they're relevant.

In terms of the burden, they said they're

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standing on the fact they say it's unduly burdensome to even look for those documents because they might be privileged. We take issue with that as well, Your Honor, and that gets into the second issue or second part of the dispute, which is documents relating to funding and financing, which is a component but not the sole dispute that relates to the untenable position they've taken in this case.

As it relates to the funding and financing issue, it's Robocast that took the position before this Court just last year that litigation is a big piece of Robocast's business and raising capital to finance its litigation efforts is part of its business strategy. That is consistent, Your Honor, not only with it opposition to its motion to transfer in the Google case, but it's also consistent with their production to date. Ιf they look back at their pre-2014 production, those do show that they produced documents in the prior litigation relating to their licensing and enforcement efforts, and that undermines their assertion here that those documents are somehow privileged and unduly

burdensome to so log.

Of course, if they want to assert privilege, they have the burden as the plaintiff and the holder of the alleged privilege to prove that those documents are privileged by, at a minimum, logging those documents, which we believe are highly relevant to the case, and shouldn't bar them doing a reasonable search for materials that are highly relevant to this case, and they are on the damages issues as well as liability.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks very much. Let's turn it over to Robocast.

Let's focus right now, if we could, on your production to them. You can make your argument about why their production is deficient in a second. Let's just focus on what they want from you. What is your position on documents post-dating 2014? That you don't have any? That you don't have any that aren't privileged? Or they're not relevant? What's the exact position?

MR. ELLERMAN: Sure, Your Honor. Will Ellerman again.

First of all, Robocast has produced over

a million documents. That's over 4 million pages. 155,000-some-odd of those documents are e-mails. The only justification that Netflix has given for documents post-dating 2014 is that it's somehow relevant to a hypothetical negotiation. They have not explained how it could possibly be relevant to a hypothetical negotiation that would have occurred years before 2014.

The hypothetical negotiation date in this case predates the damages period, which is 2016 to 2020. It would have occurred way more than six years ago. We don't know exactly when the hypothetical negotiation occurred because Netflix has not given us sufficient documentation to pin that down. But my point is to the extent they say it's relevant to the hypothetical negotiation, we need to dig further back in time than 2014 because it appears, in all likelihood, that the playlist feature that's accused was probably introduced sometime in 2012 or earlier.

But, Your Honor, as far as what Robocast has, there's nothing -- we -- first of all, we -- Robocast has never taken the position

that it's not going to turn over a relevant document that may have been created after 2014 that's somehow relevant to the time period in this case. But the fact of the matter is Robocast is not a big company --

THE COURT: That's exactly the opposite of what they say. You have not taken the position that you won't turn over documents after 2014?

MR. ELLERMAN: We have taken the position that it's unduly burdensome for us to sort through all of the privileged documents that exist during this time period in order to try to find anything that might be marginally relevant.

Robocast is basically a two-man operation that's largely a holding company today. It's had no commercial activity since 2014 aside from the patent licenses that have been produced. It's had no other litigations since the Microsoft and the Apple cases concluded. So if it has anything at all, it's either going to be a massive volume of privileged information, and there may be documents related to potential litigation funding.

Our point is even if there was some minuscule bit of relevant information during this time period, it would be outweighed by the burden of having to log virtually every communication as privileged.

THE COURT: Okay. I've heard enough on this dispute. I take your point. I don't know if "ironic" is the right word, but I can't find on this record that it would be burdensome for Robocast, as the party who's bringing this suit, to produce documents. So here's what you need to do. You need to -- if the parties can agree on how a privilege log should be exchanged and they don't require document-by-document logging, that's fine. I don't know what you all have agreed on.

But Robocast needs to search for documents that post-date 2014 that are responsive to the request for production made by the defendant, and if those documents are responsive, they need to be produced. If they're responsive but they're privileged, they need to be logged.

Are there any such documents -- this question is for counsel for Plaintiff -- that

are -- here's what I'm trying to get at: Do I need to discuss this litigation funding issue, or are you going to claim that those are all privileged so we really don't need to talk about whether litigation funding documents are relevant?

MR. ELLERMAN: Our primary objection, Your Honor, on the litigation funding documents is that they are not relevant under the authority of this Court. We've cited the Court to a couple of cases from Judge Andrews where he says funding-related documents are not relevant. Producing them gives the defendant an unfair advantage.

Netflix has cited to cases that don't apply here. One case sought production of an IP insurance policy. That's not a funding document. And other Courts in the district have said that the one case that Netflix relies on, Acceleration Bay, does not stand for the proposition that funding documents are relevant, are always relevant. What it stands for is that, really, any document might be relevant as long as the party seeking it can establish its relevance.

And here, in none of the briefing that

Netflix has submitted to this Court has it even

tried to explain how potential funding

documents might be relevant to any particular

fact in this case at all. It just says, well,

some Courts in the district require disclosure

of funding information; therefore, Robocast

must do that as well. And that's not the law

in the district. That's not what the cases

they cited to say, and we don't believe that

there's been any showing here whatsoever of

relevance for any funding documents.

So we would ask -- we understand the Court's ruling about post-2014 documents, but we would ask that the Court carve out any funding documents from that order.

THE COURT: Here's what my ruling is on this: I wouldn't say that I'm carving out anything. If there's a document that is responsive to one of Defendants' other requests but it also talks about litigation funding, that document is not going to be carved out. That document needs to be logged. I'm not going to order that litigation funding documents need to be produced at this point,

but I'm also not carving them out from Plaintiff's obligation to log privileged communications.

Let me hear from Netflix. Is that ruling clear? Is there anything else you want to raise?

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, I think that covers it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

All right. And Google and YouTube, that covers yours as well; is that right?

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, sorry. This is Rachel Cohen. Just to be clear, the obligation is on Robocast to log its documents that are responsive even if they cover litigation funding, and that is consistent with its representation to the Court that its business is licensing funding, and that goes to issues such as valuation and invalidity. And, you know, we do cite multiple cases, including from Judge Andrews, that discuss the relevance of these documents. We want to make sure they are properly logged, and if they contend that they happen to be privileged, that we can have

a record to be able to come back to the Court if we disagree with their privilege claims.

Otherwise, we run the risk of coming back here just to ask for documents that they withheld as what they contend irrelevant without our ability to challenge that.

THE COURT: Right. I have said that if a document is responsive both to a request that asks for documents pertaining to litigation funding as well as another request that pertains to something else -- I'm sure that you have plenty of them that also cover the litigation funding documents -- that that needs to be logged. If it solely has to do with funding and it's not responsive to anything else, they don't have to log it. It's hard for me to imagine that there would be a document that would fall into that category.

MS. COHEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to Robocast's letter.

I'm a little bit challenged here.

Actually, "little bit" is an understatement.

I'm a lot challenged here with respect to

Robocast's letter because it's asking me to

make some orders about production, and I don't have in front of me any of Robocast's discovery requests as required by the local rule. Can you show me where those are in the record?

MR. ELLERMAN: Your Honor, I don't know that we included the specific RFPs in the record, but the issues are global, so they're not something that we need to parse through individual requests to discuss.

THE COURT: And I would appreciate that position more if I felt like we hadn't already been here exactly on this issue and I asked you all to parse through and discuss exactly why certain requests needed e-mail discovery.

MR. ELLERMAN: That's what we have been -- we've been completely unable to do that, Your Honor, and we understood and appreciated the Court's statements at the last conference where you told the parties to exchange ESI custodians, have a discussion with those custodians about what they have and what might be in their e-mail, and then have a meaningful discussion with the other side and explain what they have. We've been willing to

do that from Robocast's standpoint, but the problem we have is although Netflix has disclosed ESI custodians, it has also in the same breath said we're not going to produce any e-mails to you no matter what.

So having that discussion with that predetermined outcome of they're not going to give us e-mails no matter what we say, no matter what we point to, no matter what we argue, is not productive, so what we've requested is that the Court order Netflix that it's going to have to engage in this process with the idea that at the end of the process, when it's concluded, it's going to have to produce some scope of e-mails. And we just can't break past that barrier with Netflix.

THE COURT: Did you get a list of ten custodians from Netflix? Is that part of the issue?

MR. ELLERMAN: Well, we previously got three custodians only on technical topics. We went back and forth and round and round, asked for more. We told them what topics we wanted them on. Last night -- or I'm sorry. Not last night. Friday, this past Friday, when

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the briefing was due, they disclosed two additional ESI custodians, a corporate controller and a marketing and operations director. We had also asked for custodians on licensing and research and development. We haven't gotten those yet. We don't know if we will. But in answer to your question, we've gotten five custodians.

THE COURT: Let me turn it to Netflix.

Did you not read the default rule to identify at least ten? And you can make the argument why you don't need to produce the custodians, but you need to at least give the other side ten.

MS. COHEN: Hi, Your Honor. Again, this is Rachel Cohen for Netflix.

Your Honor, based on the June 2nd teleconference, we understood that the parties would have some flexibility to the default to disclose custodians who have the most relevant information and also discuss where the documents are actually located as it relates to the facts and issues in the case, and that's exactly what we have sought to do here.

And we have disclosed now a total of five, and we certainly would like to continue to have a meaningful discussion with Robocast about what they do and don't have. And as we've repeatedly explained to them and as they have not acknowledged during the meet-and-confer process, that many of the documents they seek, including sales and financials and licensing and source code, are materials that are actually located in noncustodial data sources.

The other issue, Your Honor, is we asked to have a meaningful discussion as it relates to all the ESI, and to date, they've only disclosed two ESI custodians. And, you know, it's just less than a year ago they represented to the Court that they had four employees in opposing the transfer motion for Google and that documents would be coming from those individuals that were located on the East Coast, and they've been unwilling to speak with us about those.

So we've been happy to have a meaningful discussion, but this case -- we believe, as it relates to Robocast -- to Netflix, rather, the

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number of custodians disclosed should be tailored to the claims and the issues that are presented here. These claims that they've acknowledged date back from over ten years. They elected not to pursue their claims when they had other litigations going. Because the cases failed, there's a very limited damages window, and it relates to just direct infringement claims. And that's one of the primary reasons why a lot of the documents we expect and have been producing are in noncustodial and not custodial data sources.

THE COURT: I understand your position on that. Here's what I'll say about the number of custodians issue: I don't think that my comments during the June teleconference were unclear, and I'm looking here at page 31. It says the parties can, if they haven't already, exchange the names of ten custodians just so both sides can see it, but this doesn't necessarily mean that you have to search the e-mail for all custodians.

So I know later that I talked about it could be less, but I think read in context, that more had to do with a party that might not

have ten employees. So everybody needs -everybody with more than ten employees needs to
have ten, and maybe you can put on there that
this person is unlikely to have any information
in their custodial files, but you can't say, I
don't think, with a straight face that they
don't have any e-mails that are relevant. They
might be very marginally relevant, but you have
to produce them. But you need to put them on
the list, and the local rule -- not the local
rule. The default standard says it should go
from the most likely to least likely, but let
me turn to Robocast.

Have you given them two people? Why haven't you given four, given that it sounds like you had more than two employees at least at some point in time that's relevant to this dispute?

MR. ELLERMAN: We -- Your Honor, my understanding is we only have two employees, and we provided those two employees as our ESI custodians. And on top of that, we've already produced 155,000 e-mails in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand that.

Did you have any more than two employees during

any period of time that you're asking for damages for?

MR. ELLERMAN: I will have to go back and double check that, Your Honor. If that was the case, we can address that.

THE COURT: All right. So put them all on your list. Okay. So that's the number of custodians issue.

With respect to e-mail discovery, I need to understand a little bit more about where we're at in the case. So I understand that we've still got documents being produced that are not e-mail documents. I understand that the deadline for substantial completion of document production isn't until November. I also understand that we didn't get document requests from Robocast for four months after the scheduling order was entered. I understand all of these things.

The thing that I need to know is, putting aside e-mail discovery, when do Netflix and YouTube and Google think they're going to be in a position to produce what they need to produce in this case, putting the e-mail discovery aside?

And the reason why I'm asking is this:

Because I could be amenable to saying you don't have to do e-mail discovery right now, but I want to try to keep this case on the schedule, so I need to know when you can produce the rest of the stuff.

Go ahead.

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, this is

Jordan Jaffe on behalf of Google and YouTube.

With regard to the e-mail discovery and the RFP issues, our situation is this: They did not propound any RFPs until May 15, 2023, and those were, ballpark, 56. And they were largely duplicative and related to damages issues.

We responded to those RFPs and have been meeting and conferring with them about those RFPs, and they have identified no specific deficiency in our document production regarding those RFPs. They make blanket statements about the number of documents we produced, but they don't identify any specific RFP where we have not produced sufficient documents. We also have produced source code and made that available for inspection as well. So that's

number one.

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And then --

THE COURT: Just to make sure, your point of view is that you produced everything that they've requested?

MR. JAFFE: No, not everything. We are rolling production, but they haven't identified anything that's deficient. They haven't identified anything where we haven't produced something, where we haven't produced noncustodial ESI information, and therefore, we need to go to e-mail.

That goes to point two, which is we met and conferred with them on their only outstanding RFPs, and we said we don't think e-mail makes sense for these. And they haven't come back with any specifics for the RFPs that gives us guidance.

And at least our understanding, in thinking about the prior teleconference with Your Honor, was let's not do this in the abstract. Let's talk about specific requests you have and whether e-mail was appropriate, and that's exactly what we've done on behalf of Google and YouTube, is gone to them and said

these RFPs don't make sense.

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But just to be clear, we, on behalf of Google and YouTube, are not saying no e-mail discovery, period. At least as of now, our proposal is that it's phased, and specifically what we proposed is the parties talk to each other after the substantial completion of document production deadline and identify any issues where they think e-mail would be necessary and proportional to the needs of the case, and at that time, if there are any remaining disputes, we bring them to the Court, but that we do this in phases, where if there's a sufficient production of noncustodial information, that we don't need to go into e-mail, as opposed to Robocast's position, which is just this blanket position not even tethered to any specific request for production.

The last thing I'll mention before we move on, which is in our letter brief, and this is ECF 103 at Footnote 3, we noted the only allegations of indirect and willful infringement as to Google are for one of the three patents-in-suit, which is the '451

patent, and to the extent that those claims are dismissed, we don't believe that Robocast has made any showing that e-mail is appropriate, and we directed -- we cited our prior motion to dismiss on this point, and Judge Andrews, in denying the motion to dismiss as to the '451 patent, he permitted us leave to refile upon a Federal Circuit order, which is the *In Re:*

That happened to come out yesterday, so we are analyzing that decision, and we plan to refile a motion to dismiss to dismiss the '451 patent. If and when that happens, we don't think e-mail discovery will be appropriate at all for Google and YouTube, given the lack of indirect and willful infringement in the cases. And that's an additional reason why we think phasing is appropriate, because it will allow that motion to play out, and we may not need to get into e-mail discovery on those issues. It will give us time to have our motion be briefed.

THE COURT: Going back to my question, I think the answer was in there, and the answer is that you're going to be able to

be prepared to have completed your rolling production of responses, non-e-mail documents, by November and not earlier, and that we've still got plenty of time between November and the close of fact discovery in April to both worry about the e-mails and get all the depositions taken. Is that fair to say?

MR. JAFFE: On behalf of Google and YouTube, that's fair, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Let me hear from Robocast why Google's proposal is not good enough for you.

MR. ELLERMAN: Sure, Your Honor.

First of all, I want to make clear that we don't have a dispute teed up with Google between Robocast and Google on the sufficiency or not of their document production. We're taking them at their word that they're going to roll more substantial production out between now and November.

That being said, we also don't have a dispute, in my mind, with Google about whether we're going to engage in e-mail discovery.

They have not said we are not producing e-mails, so it's a different issue than the one

presented with Netflix.

But we do see a problem with the idea of a phased e-mail discovery process because the deadline for substantial completion of document discovery is November 17th. Under Google's proposal, we would wait until, I guess, around the first of the year to either have an agreement on the scope of e-mail discovery or come back to the Court and get an order on the scope of e-mail discovery, and then we've got a discovery deadline in April. So that would give us just a few very short months to complete discovery and conduct depositions, and we would need the e-mail discovery to be completed before we start taking depositions in this case.

So our fear is we're just going to get -we're going to be in a situation where there
are large dumps of documents on or near the
substantial completion deadline in November.
Then we've got to sort out, after the holidays,
all the issues with e-mail discovery and figure
out what the scope of that is going to be, get
the e-mails produced, and then there's
virtually no time left to do discovery and take

all the depositions we need to take. We think if there's going to be a phasing-in of e-mail discovery, that process really needs to start now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Isn't part of issue here that we lost four months due to the fact that you hadn't served requests until the summer?

MR. ELLERMAN: Well, I don't know. I mean, we served our requests, and there's been time to respond to those requests and start producing documents. We've not received much in the way of documents at all from Google to date. It's even worse from Netflix. We can talk about that in our next issue, but, you know, what I'm afraid is happening here is that no matter when document requests are served -- and to be clear, we have served document requests on issues unrelated to damages. We served technical requests as well.

We -- Google and Netflix keep reiterating that their source code is available for review. The fact of the matter is we were not able to schedule source code review until right now because the protective order wasn't entered until last week. So, you know, what I'm afraid

is happening here is that parties, defendants, are just going to wait until closer to the November deadline and see that as a deadline when they need to produce documents instead of when document requests are due, which is 30 days after the requests are served.

THE COURT: I've got it.

All right. One more question for Google, and this is really what I was trying to get at with my first question, which is given that you're not producing e-mails right now, under your proposal, you say you don't need to, is there a reason why we can't get the document production substantially complete before

November 17th such that we can build in a little more time? I may be more likely to adopt your proposal if we had a little more time built in. Do you understand what I'm asking?

MR. JAFFE: Yes, Your Honor, and let me address one item briefly about that.

Counsel for Robocast mentioned their technical RFPs. Those are not actually due until, I think, a week from tomorrow. It's not the case that there's this broad outstanding set of

discovery.

With regard to the existing RFPs, the ones that they propounded in May, I don't see a reason why we couldn't substantially produce completion to those before the deadline. That should be no problem.

But as they propound more and the parties need to meet-and-confer on their scope and whether they're appropriate, we can't really commit on this record to doing that when we don't even know what the RFPs are and what that universe is.

THE COURT: That's fair. When do you think, with respect to these documents that have already been requested, it's the end of August now, when do you think you'll be in a position to have those mostly produced?

MR. JAFFE: We just served supplemental RFP responses to a number of those RFPs, I want to say within the last week, and so the next step there for us is meeting and conferring with them to see if there's any sort of specific areas that they have issues with our supplemental responses on those issues.

Again, I'm hesitant to give a specific

time, but let me just kind of overarching -our understanding is we produced substantially
the documents that comply with those RFPs based
on our current responses, and so it would be
kind of meeting and conferring with them on
additional documents that they believe are
appropriate in response to those RFPs.

THE COURT: I think I understand what you're saying. Okay.

With respect to the e-mail discovery issue, I think that Google's proposal is appropriate, and it's the proposal that the Court is going to adopt here with the understanding that there's not -- this is not a situation where Google is holding back documents to dump on November 17th. What I'm hearing is they're getting produced as they get identified and that outstanding documents are the ones that the parties are working through with respect to what's appropriate in their meet-and-confers.

So okay. I'm just getting all my discovery letters organized here.

All right. Let's talk about Netflix.

Does Google's proposal sound okay to Netflix as

well?

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MS. COHEN: So again, this is Rachel Cohen for Netflix.

Your Honor, while I appreciate that Google may be in the same situation in a few months down the road if and when the '451 patent drops out of the case, we are in substantially different footing at the present time because the Court has already dismissed the indirect and willful infringement claims against Netflix. The only claims in this case are direct infringement. Courts have found that where there are only direct infringement claims, the damages window is limited, as it is in this case, and the patents have long expired, that e-mail discovery is not relevant. And Robocast's letter failed to identify a single substantive reason associated with its document requests that justifies e-mail discovery from Netflix. So at this juncture, we don't think any discovery -- e-mail discovery from Netflix is warranted, and we have not argued any specific reason it is to this Court.

THE COURT: I understand counsel's

point on that.

So the way that it's presented to me is the same dispute I think that I heard already in June. And again, I'm going to deny requests for e-mail discovery at this point because of the unique circumstances pointed out by Netflix, but I'm not going to say that this is something that can't be raised by Robocast later on when they've identified a reason why the e-mails are relevant, and I think the best way to do that is to do it along with Google's proposal as to the timing.

Let me just make sure for the record that I understand from Netflix where they are in terms of their document production. Go ahead.

MS. COHEN: So as it relates to technical RFPs, they were only served last week, so we are reviewing them and providing our -- we will provide timely responses and objections, and we will confirm the responsive information. So I want to make sure the record is clear those only just were served, so we're meeting our obligations, of course, for those and the prior ones.

The prior requests, as the Court has

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already acknowledged, they were served four months after the ability to serve opening They are limited to the issue of We have been -- we timely served our damages. responses and objections, and we've been rolling out production. The last three weeks alone, we made a production each week where I think nearly 4,000 documents have been produced relating to issues of Netflix's licenses, its revenue information, what drives and does not drive demand for Netflix, which is, unsurprisingly, not related to the issues products, rather its award-winning content. So we have been actively producing documents related to the damages requests that were served two months ago, and we will continue to do so.

I think we're similarly situated to Google with respect to the fact that we certainly have every intent to produce our responsive documents sufficiently in connection with the schedule and the substantial completion deadline for the ones that have been served to date.

And in terms of the source code, I do

want to make clear that the source code, which is the primary source of relevant information for whether or not the accused functionality infringes, has been available since April.

Robocast has not reviewed it, and contrary to their representations that it relates to

Netflix in particular, we said they could come look at the code consistent with the default for source code, and they have declined to do so.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead, counsel.

MR. ELLERMAN: This is Will Ellerman.

May I respond to that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ELLERMAN: First of all, let me address the source code. I touched on this. We couldn't very well go review source code because we had no provision worked out about the source code manifest and, basically, the table of contents of the source code and how that was going to be handled. We didn't get that sorted out with Netflix and Google until last week. So looking at source code before last week would have been looking for a needle

in a haystack. It would have been a fruitless endeavor. We understand that the code has been made available, but we've been severely restricted in our ability to view it until now.

I want to give Your Honor just a sense of what we have received to date from Netflix.

Taking out their prior art production, we've gotten 60 documents totalling around 2,000 pages before late last night, when we got a document production of a bunch of public SEC filings for Netflix. That's what it appears to be. We haven't had time to review it all yet. But to date, what they have produced in this case is 12 core technical documents, a bunch of prior art documents, public SEC filings, public news articles, and screenshots from their own website and some licensing agreements.

We're concerned about this. This is why we've asked Netflix for a schedule repeatedly. We've asked them when are you going to substantially produce documents. They refused to tell us. They refused to tell us the last time we met-and-conferred a week and a half ago, and then we got a dump last night of public documents.

Your Honor, the most frustrating thing about this, I think we heard it on the call today, is that Netflix says the bulk of its documents is going to come from non-custodial data sources. Netflix knows that, so it obviously knows what documents it has. It knows where those documents are. It has not produced them, and it will not tell us when it's going to produce them.

So we're concerned that we're going to get up until November 17th and then we're finally going to start getting documents and then we're going to have to look and see what's missing at that point and come back to the Court and start this all over again after the substantial completion of document discovery is over, and that's going to jam us up on getting discovery done, getting depositions done, sorting out issues of e-mail discovery, and everything else.

 $\label{eq:THECOURT: Understood.} \mbox{ Understood.}$ Let me switch it to Netflix.

Do you disagree with his characterization about what's been produced to date? Have you gone through and collected, for example,

financial documents that were requested from a non-custodial status source and produced that, and when do you expect that to be close to done?

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, we completely disagree with the representations of Robocast's counsel.

Just to level set at the very beginning, first of all, these requests were served in June. Our responses were due in July, and we've been producing since August. So we produced nearly 4,000 documents responsive to their requests, and they've produced zero documents. No documents. No e-mails from their possession other than the documents that they reproduced from the Microsoft and Apple cases.

So it's really interesting that they're taking issue with our production, which even though there was a four-month lag from the time we served our requests on March 1st of this year and they served their first request in June, we produced nearly 4,000 documents more than they have in the relevant window. So it's really unfortunate where we are today, and they

have not identified a single RFP to you or to us where they contend we haven't given responsive information for which they are seeking that we need to produce.

We are actively reviewing their requests, and we told them -- we gave them proper responses and objections and told them what we're producing and where we need clarification so we can meet our obligations.

And we told them we're producing on a rolling basis, which is exactly what we've done. It seems like they're complaining we produced documents last week and this week, but that's exactly what we told them we would do, consistent with the schedule and consistent with our conduct in this case, which is to, obviously, comply with our obligations and pull the relevant material. And that includes revenue information, licensing information, and how our products work.

THE COURT: Understood. All right. We've got all that on the record now. That's helpful.

So I will again reiterate my ruling from before, that we're not going to order any

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e-mail discovery at this time, but I will just remind everybody on the phone that that doesn't mean that we're going to hold everything until the substantial completion deadline. Everyone needs to keep moving.

And I will also say this: And I get it, that it's enticing to compare the burdens on your clients versus the burdens on the other side, and it seems to be a theme in this case, and certainly Defendants are trying to paint a picture for the Court that perhaps Plaintiffs aren't so much interested in obtaining discovery as much as they are interested in causing Defendants to incur costs, and that's the picture that Defendants are trying to paint.

It seems to be going on on both sides, and I understand that that may be the economics of the situation in this case, but keep in mind that the Court is actually needing to decide what amount of discovery is proportional to the needs of the case in accordance with the law, so that needs to be microcomputed and I'm doing the best I can on this limited record.

So let's turn to Robocast's next request

against Netflix, which it seems like we just resolved, which has to do with the volume of documents. We discussed that on the record, and now we've got Robocast's request for an order compelling Netflix to produce responsive documents from outside the damages period.

MR. ELLERMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Will Ellerman.

THE COURT: -- and I'll hear what Netflix's position is.

MR. ELLERMAN: So Netflix has refused to produce any documents across the board from outside the damages period, which is roughly from 2016 to 2020. Google says that it will produce documents preceding the damages period but only for prior art and comparable licenses. Netflix says no documents whatsoever. It's not going to do it.

And we acknowledge the six-year lookback on discovery imposed by the Court's default order, but we also point out that that provision could be modified upon a showing of good cause, and here, we absolutely have good cause. We have necessary cause, and that's because of the unique situation of this case.

Documents predating the damages period are extremely relevant because the hypothetical negotiation predates the damages period.

The hypothetical negotiation, as the Court knows, is the date of first infringement, and we cited the Court to authority that that date can be outside the damages period. The oldest patent-in-suit here was issued in 2006, and Netflix's and Google's playlist features were introduced before 2016, which is the beginning of the damages period.

We don't know exactly when that hypothetical negotiation date is. It's sometime in there. We hope to find that out during discovery, but it's not just the date that we need. It's all of the relevant facts surrounding that date that the parties would have had knowledge of when they sat down at the hypothetical negotiating table. I will quote here in the Federal Circuit in the later Dynamics case where it said, "In considering the 15 Georgia-Pacific factors, it is presumed that the parties had full knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the infringement at that time," at the time of the

hypothetical negotiation.

So what Netflix and Google are putting Robocast in a position of is potentially having an expert, a damages expert, trying to give an opinion about a hypothetical negotiation completely in the dark with no information from the defendant about the accused functionality during that time period and all of the facts surrounding the *Georgia Pacific* factors during that time period. So for Netflix and Google to say that we get no information that predates 2016 severely hamstrings our ability to calculate a reasonable royalty in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. So the issue that I'm having here is you're saying you want all documents responsive that are prior to 2016, and they're saying you should have no documents prior to that date because you haven't articulated what the relevance is. Isn't it right that what I should do is order them to produce -- to go back and produce some documents to the extent that they're relevant to an issue that you just talked about, but not respond to every single document you request going back before 2016; right?

MR. ELLERMAN: Well, as Your Honor -Your Honor, as they -- as Netflix and Google
have both pointed out, the RFP set that we
served first was financial discovery, so all of
that goes to damages and the hypothetical
negotiation.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what I'm going to say: I understand your point. I'm not going to say that your request is denied, but I'm not going to grant it at this point.

And the reason why is I don't have your request. I have no basis to say what's appropriate to go back or whether there's good cause to go back. So pick the requests you want to have some discovery, and those -- and you should be able to explain to them why you need documents outside of 2016.

I disagree that documents from 2016 are never going to be -- prior to 2016 are never going to be relevant, but I don't understand that to be what Netflix was saying. Netflix was saying you've got to say what you want and articulate the basis for why you need it, and I agree with them on that. You can reraise with the Court. I need to have your requests.

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MR. ELLERMAN: Your Honor, may I clarify a couple of things?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ELLERMAN: First of all, it has been very clear from Netflix that this is not a request-by-request issue, it's an across-the-board issue, but I understand the Court's ruling.

I do want to point out one thing, though, and that there are likely documents from before and after the damages period that reflect information from within the damages period, and Netflix and Google shouldn't be able to draw an arbitrary line that they're only going to produce documents that were created during the damages period. There could be documents predating the damages period that contain information like financial forecasts for the damages period or documents after the period that contain historical data about historical revenues and things like that. I don't think this bright line distinction of we're only giving you things created during the damages period is ever appropriate.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks for

that. I just said it wasn't, and that's how
we're going to move forward. So talk with them
about what things you want from prior to 2016,
and we'll talk about what the burden is, and
we'll decide if you have good cause to get it.
Right now, I can't rule on this.

So your request to compel, to the extent
it's a request to compel, is going to be denied

So your request to compel, to the extent it's a request to compel, is going to be denied at this point. But they understand from listening to what I said today that they need to work with you a little bit on this.

All right. What do we have left?

Anything else that you want from Netflix?

MR. ELLERMAN: I believe that is all of Robocast's issues, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And anything that you want from Google?

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, this is

Jordan Jaffe. I think we covered all the
issues for Google, and the last one on our list
was the time period issue.

If I may add just one item on that, we didn't see any argument from them that information after the expiration date was relevant. They didn't make any arguments about

1	that in their brief, and so we understand that
2	issue to be undisputed. But we take Your
3	Honor's ruling that they can articulate the
4	request, and we'll deal with it at that time.
5	THE COURT: Okay. Great. I think
6	that makes a ton of sense, and it's very
7	reasonable.
8	All right. Anything else anybody else
9	wants to say before we call it a day?
10	All right. Great. Everyone take care.
11	Bye-bye.
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1 CERTIFICATE 2 STATE OF DELAWARE ss: COUNTY OF NEW CASTLE 3 I, Deanna L. Warner, a Certified 4 5 Shorthand Reporter, do hereby certify that as such Certified Shorthand Reporter, I was 6 7 present at and reported in Stenotype shorthand the above and foregoing proceedings in Case 8 Number 22-CV-305-RGA-JLH, ROBOCAST vs. NETFLIX, 9 heard on August 29, 2023. 10 I further certify that a transcript of 11 12 my shorthand notes was typed and that the 13 foregoing transcript, consisting of 59 typewritten pages, is a true copy of said 14 15 **DISCOVERY CONFERENCE.** SIGNED, OFFICIALLY SEALED, and FILED 16 with the Clerk of the District Court, NEW 17 CASTLE County, Delaware, this 3rd day of 18 September, 2023. 19 20 21 Warner, Deanna L. 22 Speedbudget Enterprises, LLC 2.3 24 25

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